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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”1  
However, the law is multiple experiences, not one.  Litigation brings 
these various experiences together.  While plaintiffs, defendants, and 
their attorneys each have different backgrounds and different interests 
that affect the course of litigation, the adjudicators within a case—the 
trial judge, the jury, and appellate judges—have an equally important 
impact on a case’s outcome.  The right to a jury trial preserved by the 
Seventh Amendment helps determine the extent to which the 
adjudicators impact the outcome of a particular case. 
Implicit within the right to a jury trial are considerations regarding 
which adjudicator properly decides each issue, a determination which 
takes into account the various experiences of each adjudicator.  Trial 
judges have general legal experience as they regularly interpret the 
written law and construe legal documents.2  Full dockets also provide 
trial judges with administrative experience.3  In contrast to trial judges, 
juries generally lack familiarity with the law.  Jurors compensate for 
their lack of legal know-how with practical experience.  Collectively, the 
jury contributes its real world experience, which each individual juror 
gained through his or her unique life experiences, various occupations, 
and differing educational backgrounds.4  In the background of any 
discussion on trial level adjudicators lurks the threat of appeal to 
appellate courts with appellate judges.  Appellate judges are ideally 
selected for their legal expertise and experience.5  While trial judges 
have legal experience, appellate judges generally have a broader and 
deeper perspective, since they are exposed to a wide range of cases and 
have “a greater opportunity to research, analyze, discuss, and debate 
 1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 2. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review – Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 
231, 239 (1991); Nichole Biglin, Enablement: For the Judge or the Jury? Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.’s Analysis Applied, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 145, 156 (2003). 
 3. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC.& PROCESS 101, 
105 (2005). 
 4. Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of Law” or a “Question of 
Fact?”: the Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 196 (1999). 
 5. Warner, supra note 3, at 105. 
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important legal issues.”6  As with all litigation, adjudicators’ 
experiences interact in public employee free sp
The Supreme Court has held that whether a public employee’s speech 
is constitutionally protected is a question of law for the judge to 
determine.7  However, the Court’s holding in Garcetti v. Ceballos8 
altered the analysis used when determining if a public employee’s 
speech is constitutionally protected.  By altering the test, the Court 
opened the door to questioning the traditional holding that the protected 
status of speech is a question of law.  Through this open door, multiple 
circuits have weighed in, creating a circuit split as to whether that 
determination is to be made by the judge or the jury.  This Comment 
argues that in order to protect the substance of the jury trial right and in 
light of the Court’s recent changes to the public employee free speech 
analysis, the inquiry into the protected status of public employee speech 
must be a mixed question of law and fact. 
Part II of this Comment addresses the right to a jury trial preserved by 
the Seventh Amendment in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Part II 
also addresses the proper allocation of responsibility to the judge and the 
jury.  Part III explores the Supreme Court’s test for analyzing public 
employee free speech.  Part IV uses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 849 to address the circuit 
split.  Part V synthesizes the previous portions of the Comment to argue 
that the protected status of speech must be labeled a mixed question of 
law and fact in order to protect the substance of the right to a jury trial.  
Finally, Part VI concludes that the uncertainty introduced by the 
Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision should be resolved by adopting the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach in Posey. 
II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 
Lord Coke’s axiom that “[j]udges decide questions of law; juries 
decide questions of fact” provides the origins of the question of law/fact 
dichotomy.10  The rule has been generally accepted since the mid-
 6. Id. 
 7. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). 
 8. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 9. 546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 10. The quotation is a translation of Lord Coke’s rule “‘ad questioniam facti non respondent 
judices, . . . ad questioniam juries non respondent juratores.’”  J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the 
Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483, 485 n.7 (1985) (quoting 1 E. COKE, COMMENTARY OF 
LITTLETON *155.b). 
3
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sixteenth century and is recognized by the Supreme Court.11  However, 
the rule only applies when there is a jury trial.12  In the United States, 
the Seventh Amendment serves as the basis for the right to a jury trial.  
The Seventh Amendment states, “[i]n [s]uits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved . . . according to the rules of the common law.”13  The 
vagueness of this language preserves an undefined right to trial by jury, 
which poses two key questions: what causes of action trigger the jury 
right and what questions must be decided by the jury once the right is 
triggered?14  Each of these questions will be addressed below. 
A. Triggering the Right to Trial by Jury 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate the Seventh 
Amendment’s preservation of the right to a jury trial.15  Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 38(b) permits any party to demand their right to 
trial by jury as preserved by the Seventh Amendment or as provided for 
by a federal statute.16  A public employee attempting to vindicate 
infringements on their right to freedom of speech asserts their claim 
through federal statute.17  Therefore, the right to a jury trial must be 
analyzed under both the Seventh Amendment and as guaranteed by the 
requisite federal statute. 
1. Trial by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment 
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in suits at 
common law.18  This language refers to suits for legal rights but not for 
equitable rights.19  At the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted 
suits for legal and equitable rights were adjudicated in separate forums; 
however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a unified system 
 11. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“The controlling distinction between the power 
of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to 
determine the facts.”). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1).  “In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”  Id. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 14. Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1126 (2003). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a), (b). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 447 
(1830). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447. 
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under which legal and equitable rights can both be adjudicated in the 
same forum.20  Despite this merger, the Supreme Court “has carefully 
preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.”21  The 
Supreme Court has held that whether a particular suit resolves legal 
rights depends on a two-step analysis: “First, we compare the statutory 
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to 
the merger of the courts of law and equity.  Second, we examine the 
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in 
nature.”22  When engaging in this two-step analysis, the Court has stated 
that “[t]he second inquiry is . . . more important.”23  One justice has 
suggested dispensing with the first inquiry altogether and basing the 
right to a jury trial solely on the remedy sought.24 
In Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry,25 the Supreme Court applied this 
two-step process to determine whether a group of truck drivers were 
entitled to a jury trial in their suit against the local union for breaching 
their duty of fair representation.26  The truck drivers were union 
members,27 who received seniority status within the company as 
compensation for transferring to other cities.28  After they moved, the 
truck drivers lost their bargained-for seniority status due to multiple lay-
offs.29  Following receipt of the truck drivers’ grievance, the union’s 
grievance committee determined the employer violated the truck drivers’ 
rights and ordered the company to recognize the drivers’ seniority 
status.30  Despite this ruling, the company continued to function in a 
way that deprived the drivers of their seniority status.31  As a result, two 
more grievances were filed with the union.32  The union refused to take 
 20. “There is one form of action—the civil action.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 2.  See RICHARD L. 
MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 529–31 (4th ed. 2008). 
 21. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990). 
 22. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 23. Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 565. 
 24. Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Although Justice 
Brennan agreed that the truck drivers were entitled to a jury trial, he indicated that the Court continues to 
diminish “the significance of the analogous form of action for deciding where the Seventh Amendment 
applies.  I think it is time we dispense with it altogether.”  Id. 
 25. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
 26. Id. at 562–63, 565. 
 27. Id. at 561. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 562. 
 32. Id. 
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action on the third grieva
After being denied relief within the union, the truck drivers filed suit 
against the union for “violat[ing] its duty of fair representation.”34  The 
truck drivers sued for “compensatory damages[,] for lost wages and 
health benefits” and requested a jury trial.35  The request was granted by 
the district court and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.36  The union 
appealed.37 
The Supreme Court affirmed the truck drivers’ right to a jury trial.38  
Under the first step of the analysis, the Court attempted to find a 
common law analogy to a suit alleging breach of a union’s duty; they 
held the issue was “comparable to a breach of contract claim—a legal 
issue.”39  The Court proceeded to the second step and determined that a 
damages remedy was traditionally a legal remedy.40  Since both 
inquiries indicated the suit was a legal action, the Court held that the 
truck drivers were entitled to a trial by jury.41 
2. Trial by Jury Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The right to a jury trial can be granted by federal statute.42  When a 
public employee sues his government employer, the appropriate federal 
statute depends on the individual’s employer.  If the public employee is 
employed by a state or municipal government, the employee would 
bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.43  A § 1983 suit requires two 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 563. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 566–70. 
 40. Id. at 570–71.  While damages are generally viewed as a legal remedy, there are two 
exceptions in which damages are equitable.  Id.  The first exception is when damages are restitutionary.  
Id.  The second is when the monetary damages are either incidental or intertwined with injunctive relief.  
Id. 
 41. Id. at 573. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b). 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory 
relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to 
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”). 
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elements.  First, the plaintiff must have been deprived of a right secured 
by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States.44  Second, the 
defendant must have acted under color of state law.45  This second 
requirement precludes § 1983 suits against federal officials, as these 
officials do not act under state law.  The language of § 1983 precludes 
suit against a federal government employer.46  This Part will focus on 
the right to a jury trial under § 1983. 
Although any party in an action can assert the right to a jury trial if 
the right is provided for by a federal statute,47 § 1983 “does not itself 
confer the jury right.”48  Therefore, the Supreme Court has analyzed the 
right to a jury trial in a § 1983 suit under the Court’s traditional Seventh 
Amendment two-part analysis.49  Under the historical analysis prong, 
the Court concluded the analysis is based on § 1983 as a statute instead 
of the underlying constitutional right vindicated.50  With this in mind, 
the Court noted § 1983 did not have an equivalent at the time the 
Seventh Amendment was ado 51
Despite the lack of an historical analogy, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally held that the Seventh Amendment extends to statutory 
claims unknown at common law when the suit is in essence a tort action 
 44. Id.; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150. 
 46. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 605 (5th ed. 2007).  The intricacy of a 
public employee suing their federal employer is beyond the scope of this Comment.  In brief, the 
Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, that 
the federal government could be sued for a constitutional violation without a statutory grant of authority.  
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1977).  The key proposition of Bivens was that “the judicial branch can enforce the 
Constitution without congressional action.”  See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing 
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 291 (1995).  See also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., PAMELA S. 
KARLAN, PETER W. LOW & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION 73 (2d ed. 2007) (“Although Bivens created the possibility that individuals whose 
constitutional rights are violated by federal officers can receive compensation, success is rare”).  The 
Supreme Court limited Bivens’ application in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).  In Bush, the Court 
concluded that the presence of an alternative remedial structure foreclosed bringing suit under Bivens.  
Id. at 368.  A NASA employee attempted to sue his employer for retaliating against his speech critical of 
NASA.  Id. at 369–71.  The Court refused to apply Bivens since the claims were cognizable within a 
congressional statutory scheme.  Id. at 385–86.  The Court indicated that federal civil servants were 
“protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasse[d] substantive provisions forbidding 
arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures—administrative and judicial—by which improper action 
may be redressed;” the employee’s claim was fully cognizable within the scheme precluding Bivens’ 
application.  Id.  Ultimately, “federal employees with federal constitutional claims for damages will 
nearly always have a remedy under the Civil Service Reform Act,” precluding their use of Bivens.  See 
JEFFRIES, supra, at 74. 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a)–(b). 
 48. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). 
 49. Id. at 708. 
 50. Id. at 711. 
 51. Id. at 709. 
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seeking legal relief.52  Citing its precedent, the Court concluded that 
claims brought under § 1983 sound in tort.53  Based on this analysis, the 
Court held if a § 1983 suit seeks legal relief it is an action at law under 
the Seventh Amendment.54  Therefore, the right to a jury trial in a 
§ 1983 suit is based on the type of relief sought.55 
Once it has been determined that the right to a jury trial exists, the 
court must determine which trial decisions “must fall to the jury in order 
to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 
1791.”56  This analysis is discussed in the following subsection. 
B. Allocating Responsibility Between the Judge and Jury 
Once the right to a jury trial is invoked, the decision-making authority 
within the trial must be allocated between the judge and the jury.  
Typically this allocation is done by classifying issues within the trial as 
questions of law or of fact.  When an issue is a mixed question of law 
and fact, appellate courts can classify the specific issues as either a 
question of law or of fact.57  Classification is important since the label 
affixed dictates who the decision-maker is at trial as well as the scope of 
appellate review.58 
In dividing decision-making authority, the general notion is that 
“juries decide questions of facts and judges decide questions of law.”59  
The reservation of the jury’s right to determine questions of fact is not 
explicit.  However, “the text of the [Seventh] Amendment and relevant 
statutory provisions from the same time period strongly suggest that a 
key feature of the jury right was the reservation of factual decisions for 
 52. Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 710.  This portion of the opinion is only for a plurality of justices as Justice Scalia did 
not join the opinion regarding this matter. 
 55. Id. at 710–11. 
 56. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 57. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decisions Making Authority Between the Trial and 
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural 
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1017 (1986) (“[T]he lawmaking power of the appellate courts can be 
subdivided into three subsidiary powers: (1) the law declaration power, which is the power to declare the 
law and thus to impose on the trial level decision maker general rules affecting all cases that come 
within the rules’ terms; (2) the supervisory power, which is the power to state as a matter of law, 
generally through rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence, that a particular trial level finding of 
historical or ultimate fact exceeds the limits of the discretion conferred; and (3) the classification power, 
which is the power to withdraw particular mixed law/fact questions from the discretionary power of the 
trial level by clarifying them as questions of law or as constitutional or jurisdictional facts.”). 
 58. Parker, supra note 10, at 485. 
 59. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1131. 
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the jury.”60  The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment 
states “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined . . . 
[except] according to the rules of the common law.”61  While the clause 
does not expressly allocate all issues of fact to the jury, “it suggests that 
questions of fact were understood to be peculiarly the jury’s province.”62 
The Judiciary Act,63 which was passed before the adoption of the 
Seventh Amendment, provides further support for this contention.64  The 
Act states that “the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all 
causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall 
be by jury.”65  Since the first Congress drafted the Judiciary Act and the 
Seventh Amendment, it can be said that the text of “the Judiciary Act 
provides a window into the procedural mindset of the first Congress,” 
illuminating the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.66 
Classifying an issue as a question of law or fact also affects the 
amount of deference an appellate court gives to a lower court’s 
findings.67  The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment 
prohibits a fact tried by the jury from being re-examined unless done so 
in accordance with the common law.68  Thus, appellate courts generally 
review findings of fact with great deference, overriding “the decision 
only if it is very, very wrong.”69  In contrast, findings of law are 
reviewed by appellate courts “de novo” or without deference.70 
With this as a background, the Supreme Court, in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments Inc.,71 provided grounds for determining whether 
an issue within a trial must be labeled a question of fact for the jury in 
 60. Id. at 1132. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 62. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1132–33. 
 63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
 64. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1133. 
 65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
 66. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1133 (noting that the first Congress “would not have created a 
constitutional right to a jury trial significantly different from the jury guarantee they had imposed on 
federal trial courts by statute just two years earlier.”). 
 67. If the parties do not invoke the right to a jury trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, 
the litigation takes the form of a bench trial where the jury’s fact-finding authority passes to the trial 
judge.  The trial judge’s factual findings are entitled to the same amount of deference as if the findings 
were made by a jury.  See Warner, supra note 3, at 103–05 (“[F]indings of fact are reviewed with 
deference regardless of whether they were made by a trial judge or a jury.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) 
(“In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts 
specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”). 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 69. Warner, supra note 3, at 104–05. 
 70. Id. at 105. 
 71. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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order to preserve the substance of the right to a jury trial.72  In 
Markman, the Court had to decide which judicial actor should determine 
the construction of a patent.  Markman brought suit against Westview 
and Althon Enterprises for patent infringement, claiming their reporting 
system, which tracked dry-cleaning charges on a bar code infringed on 
the patent he had for a reporting system that used bar codes to “log the 
progress of clothing through the dry-cleaning process.”73  At trial, the 
jury determined what was covered under Markman’s patent, and based 
on their patent interpretation, they found an infringement.74  However, 
the district court interpreted the extent of the patent differently, found no 
infringement, and granted Westview’s deferred motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.75 
On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
patent construction was an issue the jury was required to determine in 
order to preserve the right to a jury trial.76  Using a four-step analysis, 
the Court determined that the trial judge was the proper party to construe 
a patent.77  The first step was to look at whether the specific issue was 
historically left to a jury at common law, which could be a decisive 
factor.78  If history did not answer the question, the analysis proceeds to 
consider precedent, functional considerations, and the importance of 
uniformity within that area of law.79 
In Markman, the Supreme Court concluded that history and precedent 
did not provide any guidance so the Court looked to functional 
considerations.80  The Court held that the judge was in a better position 
to interpret the patent’s construction due to the judge’s experience, skill, 
and training in construing written documents.81  The Court also held that 
uniformity was important in patent law, which further pointed to the 
judge being the proper party to determine the construction of a patent.82 
 72. Id. at 376. 
 73. Id. at 374–75. 
 74. Id. at 375. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 376. 
 77. Id. at 377–91. 
 78. Id. at 377 (if the “clear historical evidence that the very subsidiary question was so regarded 
under the English practice of leaving the issue for a jury,” then the issue is required to go to the jury). 
 79. Id. at 384, 388–90. 
 80. Id. at 388. 
 81. Id. at 388–89. 
 82. Id. at 390.  In its opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that public policy would be served by 
uniformity in patent law.  Id.  By allowing parties to know the limitations of a patent, the patentee’s 
inventive genius is protected.  Id.  Furthermore, uniformity avoids a zone of uncertainty, which would 
discourage future patentees from experimenting for risk of patent infringement.  Id.  The Court also cites 
to the fact that “Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate 
10
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With its Markman decision, the Supreme Court “set a precedent for 
the manner of determining whether an issue should be considered a 
question of law or of fact, and thus whether the jury or the judge should 
decide the issue.”83  A court should consider whether a historical 
analysis places the issue in the purview of a specific judicial actor, and if 
it does not, the court should consider precedent, functional 
considerations, and the need for uniformity.84 
The Markman factors are employed to determine if an issue within a 
trial must be left to the jury in order to maintain the substance of the 
right to a jury trial.  With this in mind, the next two sections explore the 
issues that must be decided in a public employee free speech trial.  Part 
III examines the Supreme Court’s public employee free speech 
framework.  Part IV examines the circuit split that has developed as to 
whether the constitutionally protected status of a public employee’s 
speech is decided by the judge or the jury.  Using the Markman factors, 
Part V argues that at least some of the issues raised in a public employee 
free speech case must be decided by the jury to preserve the right to a 
jury trial.  Therefore, the protected status of speech must be labeled a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH 
FRAMEWORK 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”85  When the government acts as an 
employer, the First Amendment’s prohibitions linger in the background; 
these concerns are limited to government action and do not arise in the 
private employment context.86  Early in the twentieth century, public 
employees did not have constitutionally protected rights to free speech 
as “courts viewed public employment as a privilege that employees were 
court for patent cases.”  Id.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (uniformity would 
“strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and 
industrial innovation”). 
 83. Biglin, supra note 2, at 161–62. 
 84. Id. at 152–57, 161–62. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the party acted “under color of any statute . . . of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia.”  See Parker, supra note 10, at 511 (American non-union 
employment is typically at-will employment, which allows the employer to terminate the employment 
relationship for any reason or no reason at all.); see also Gary W. Spring, A New Methodology for 
Testing Permissible Communications in the Workplace, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023 (2008) for a 
discussion of the National Labor Relations Act and an employee’s rights to freedom of speech in the 
context of private union employment. 
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theoretically free to accept or reject.”87 
Beginning in the 1950s, the Supreme Court shied away from the 
principle that accepting public employment meant sacrificing 
constitutional rights.  In examining state mandated loyalty oaths, the 
Court held that “constitutional protection does extend to the public 
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or 
discriminatory,” which provided grounds for invalidating loyalty oath 
statutes.88  In 1967, the Court completely renounced the theory that 
public employment could be conditioned on sacrificing constitutional 
rights.89  Although public employment cannot be conditioned on forcing 
a public employee to sacrifice their constitutional rights, their rights are 
not unfettered.  Public employees’ constitutional rights are burdened by 
the government’s interests as an employer, which differ from the 
government’s interests in regulating the public’s speech.90 
The Supreme Court has attempted to flesh out the contours of a public 
employee’s constitutional rights.  Public employee free speech issues 
arise almost exclusively within the context of employer retaliation 
suits.91  A retaliation suit recognizes that “as a general matter the First 
Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an 
[employee] to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.”92  As the above 
 87. Parker, supra note 10, at 511 (“Until the 1950’s, the government could require employees to 
check their first amendment freedoms at the workplace door.”).  See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.) (“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to 
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”). 
 88. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 185, 192 (1952). 
 89. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he theory that public 
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how 
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 
(2d Cir. 1965))).  A complete abrogation of all First Amendment rights as a means of accepting public 
employment has been rejected; such complete abrogation would reduce the number of people willing to 
undertake public employment.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968). 
 90. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. (“[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the 
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general.”). 
 91. A retaliation suit arises under the theory that “[o]fficial reprisal for protected speech ‘offends 
the Constitution [because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.’”  Hartman v. Moore, 
547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998)). 
 92. Id.  See 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE 
PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.20 (1st ed. Supp. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
decisions make clear that the accommodation of the conflicting interests of the [public employee] as a 
citizen and the [public employee] as an employee requires a three-part test.  First it must be determined 
whether the speech is constitutionally protected speech.  Second, the employee must show that the 
protected speech played a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.  Third, 
even if the answer to the first two questions is yes, the employer may nevertheless avoid liability by 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that school authorities would have taken the same action 
against the employee without considering the protected speech or considering only the disruptive nature 
of speech.” (footnotes omitted)). 
12
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language recognizes, a retaliation claim arises only for speech protected 
by the First Amendment.  The question in the public employment 
context becomes what speech is protected.  Through a triumvirate of 
cases, the Supreme Court has sought to answer this question. 
A. Pickering: Balancing the Rights of Public Employees and Their 
Government Boss 
In Pickering v. Board of Education,93 the Supreme Court made its 
first attempt at determining the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects public employee speech.  The Supreme Court held that 
constitutional protection requires balancing the interests of a public 
employee as a citizen against the interests of the state as an employer.94  
If the employee’s right as a citizen to comment on a matter of public 
concern outweighs the state’s interest as an employer to promote 
efficiency, the employee’s speech should be constitutionally protected.95 
The case arose in the school context.  Pickering was a teacher who 
was dismissed after sending a letter to a local newspaper.96  Pickering’s 
letter was in response to the local newspaper publishing various letters 
sent by the Teacher’s Organization and the superintendent promoting a 
tax increase to support the local schools.97  Pickering’s letter was sent 
after the proposed tax increase failed at the polls.98  In his 
correspondence, Pickering criticized the school board’s handling of 
previous bond proposals and the disparity in fund allocation between 
athletics and academics.99  Furthermore, the letter alleged the 
superintendent prevented teachers from opposing the bond.100  
Following a full hearing by the school board, Pickering was dismissed 
due to his letter’s detrimental effect on the efficient operation and 
administration of the district’s schools; and, since the letter contained 
false statements that “unjustifiably impugned the . . . ‘integrity . . . and 
competence’” of school officials, that damaged professional reputations, 
that “would be disruptive to faculty discipline,” and that fomented 
 93. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 94. Id. at 568. 
 95. Id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”). 
 96. Id. at 564. 
 97. Id. at 566. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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controversy.101  The county circuit court and the Supreme Court of 
Illinois affirmed Pickering’s dismissal.102 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court found Pickering’s comments 
addressed matters of public concern including a difference of opinion 
“as to the preferable manner of operating the school system” and “the 
question of whether a school system requires additional funds.”103  The 
Court indicated that although Pickering’s comments were critical of 
school authorities, such statements were not per se grounds for 
dismissal.104  The Court held that in order to provide grounds for 
dismissal, statements must do more than simply anger higher ups; they 
must interfere with the ability to perform duties or affect the school’s 
ability to operate, such as destroying a superior’s authority to discipline, 
preventing the school from raising funds, or negatively impacting 
working relationships with fellow employees.105 
The Court found that none of these negative effects were present.106  
Therefore, the Court held that Pickering’s right to free speech trumped 
the school’s alleged interest in maintaining order.107  Furthermore, the 
Court indicated that even if a public employee’s comments are false, 
they cannot serve as grounds for dismissal unless they were knowingly 
false or recklessly made.108  By its own acknowledgement, the Pickering 
Court refused to provide a general standard but instead established 
“some of the general lines along which an analysis of the controlling 
interests should run.”109  Subsequent decisions have added gloss to these 
general guidelines. 
B. Connick: Increasing the Importance of Speech on Matters of Public 
Concern 
In Connick v. Myers, 110 the Supreme Court readdressed Pickering 
and emphasized the employee’s interest in commenting on matters of 
public concern.111  Myers served as assistant district attorney, an at-will 
 101. Id. at 564, 566–67. 
 102. Id. at 565. 
 103. Id. at 571. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 570–73. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 574. 
 109. Id. at 569. 
 110. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 111. Id. at 143. 
14
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to accept 
th
aintiff’s distribution of the 
questionnaire.”121  Thus, Myers prevailed. 
position serving under District Attorney Connick.112  Myers was 
informed that she was going to be transferred to a different section of 
criminal court; subsequently, she notified her supervisors that she 
opposed this transfer.113  Following another notice of the upcoming 
transfer and a meeting with her superior Dennis Waldron, Myers 
prepared a questionnaire regarding office policies.114  Before 
distributing the questionnaires, Myers was asked a third time about 
transferring, and she indicated that she would consider a transfer.115  
Shortly thereafter, Myers distributed the questionnaires to her co-
workers.116  Waldron found out about the questionnaires and contacted 
Connick, who then met with and fired Myers for “her refusal 
e transfer.”117 
Myers filed suit for First Amendment retaliation.  The district court 
held a nonjury trial on the merits of the case.118  The trial judge’s 
findings of fact concluded that Myers was terminated due to the 
questionnaire.119  In his findings of law, the trial judge determined the 
questionnaire was a matter of public concern because it “relate[d] to the 
effective functioning of the District Attorney’s Office [which] are 
matters of public importance and concern.”120  When balancing the 
employee’s and State’s interests, the trial judge concluded “it cannot be 
said that the defendant’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services performed through his employees was either adversely 
affected or substantially impeded by pl
 
 112. Id. at 140. 
he others in the office shared her concerns.  Following this, Myers decided to do 
om  Id. 
. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La. 1981), aff’d, 654 F.2d 719 (5th 
ir.1 S. 138 (1983). 
 121.
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 141.  The questionnaire solicited “the views of her fellow staff members concerning 
office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in 
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”  Id.  The notion for 
the questionnaire occurred after meeting “with Dennis Waldron, one of the first assistant district 
attorneys.”  Id.  The meeting regarded Myers’ concerns about office matters.  Id.  Waldron indicated that 
he did not believe t
s e research. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  The distribution of the questionnaires was also considered insubordination.  Id. 
 118. Myers v. Connick, 507 F
C 981), rev’d, 461 U
 119. Id. at 755. 
 120. Id. at 758. 
 Id. at 759. 
  Appropriate factors to be taken into consideration in evaluating the State’s interest in 
limiting its employees’ right to speak freely are: “(1) the need to maintain harmony 
among co-workers; (2) the need for confidentiality; (3) the need to curtail conduct which 
impedes the (employee’s) proper and competent performance of his daily duties; and (4) 
15
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In reversing the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court reiterated 
the need for public employees to maintain their rights to freedom of 
speech regarding matters of public concern.122  However, with the 
exception of one question,123 the Court held that Myers’ questionnaire 
did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern because the 
inquiries were “mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to 
another section of the criminal court.”124  Since at least part of the 
questionnaire related to a matter of public concern, the Court applied the 
Pickering balancing test and found that Myers’ speech was 
insubordinate and adversely affected working relationships.125  One 
question on the questionnaire concerned whether the employees had 
confidence in their supervisors, which in and of itself had the potential 
to undermine office relations.126  This holding effectively made the 
content of speech, whether it was on a matter of public concern a 
threshold test, which must be met before courts advance to the Pickering 
balancing test.127 
In examining whether speech is on a matter of public concern, the 
Court indicated the analysis must be based on the speech’s content, 
the need to encourage a close and personal relationship between the employee and his 
” 
. a
 v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Givhan v. 
es
mployees felt pressure 
 w
endment.”  Id. at 156 
re Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
ajority opinion). 
ll, 511 U.S. 661, 
68 ust be on a matter of public concern . . . .”). 
superiors, where that relationship calls for loyalty and confidence.
Id t 758 (quoting Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972)). 
 122. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).  In analyzing Pickering, the Court indicated 
that “the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions sought to suppress 
the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs.”  Id. at 144–45 (citing Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)) (The Court emphasized the importance of public affairs and 
public issues in the American form of government and self-governance.).  The cases following Pickering 
also attempted to safeguard speech on matters of public concern.  Id. at 145 (citing generally Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Mt. Healthy City Bd.
W tern Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)). 
 123. Id. at 146, 149.  The Court held that the inquiry into whether public e
to ork on political campaigns dealt with a matter of public concern.  Id. at 149. 
 124. Id. at 146, 148–49.  In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Connick believed the speech 
addressed matters of public concern.  The questionnaire addressed “‘the manner in which government is 
operated or should be operated,’” which “is an essential part of the communications necessary for self-
governance the protection of which was a central purpose of the First Am
(B nnan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. 
 125. Id. at 151 (m
 126. Id. at 152. 
 127. Id. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if Myers’ 
questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is 
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”).  See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 92, 
§ 2.20; United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (The Pickering 
balancing test applies if the employee’s speech was as a citizen on matters of public concern but the test 
does not apply when the speech was on matters of personal interest.); Waters v. Churchi
6 (1994) (“To be protected, the speech m
16
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he inquiry into the protected status of 
speech” is a question of law.131 
C. Garcetti: Using a Public Employee’s Job Duties to Ensure They Are 
Speaking as a Citizen 
inaccurate information contained in an affidavit used to obtain a search 
form, and context.128  The Court decided that if the speech is not related 
“to any matter of political, social, or other concern of the community,” 
then the speech is not a matter of public concern.129  Thus, “government 
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment.”130  The Court announced that this decision should be left 
to the judge, indicating that “t
By the time the Court heard Garcetti v. Ceballos,132 the inquiry into 
whether a public employee’s speech was constitutionally protected was 
a two-part analysis133 performed by the judge.134  In Garcetti, the Court 
took the opportunity to elaborate on what it means to speak as a 
citizen.135  Ceballos was a deputy district attorney exercising 
supervisory responsibilities over other attorneys in the District 
Attorney’s Office.136  A defense attorney contacted Ceballos regarding 
 
 128. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
 129. Id. at 146. 
 130. Id.  Private matters do not completely fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.  
The Court held “only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public 
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”  Id. at 147.  While 
it is advisable for public officials to be receptive “to constructive criticism offered by their employees, 
e F  not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints 
ver t 149. 
uestion 
 to the jury”).  See 
r a discussion of Connick and a proposal that policy reasons 
ublic employee speech should be left to the jury. 
th irst Amendment does
o  internal office affairs.”  Id. a
 131. Id. at 148 n.7. 
 132. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 133. Id. at 418 (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide 
interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech.  The first requires 
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  If the answer is no, 
the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the 
speech.  If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.  The q
becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 134. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7.  But see Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (although recognizing that the inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of speech is a 
question of law for the court, the Eighth Circuit recognized that “[a]ny underlying factual disputes 
concerning whether the plaintiff’s speech is  protected, however, should be submitted
also Parker, supra note 10, at 525–57, fo
indicate that the protected status of p
 135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–22. 
 136. Id. at 413. 
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rding the affidavit.  
 
warrant.137  After efforts to comprehend the discrepancies, Ceballos 
drafted a memo on the issue.138  A heated meeting was held regarding 
the warrant and the affidavit.139  Despite Ceballos’ efforts, the 
prosecution proceeded.140  During trial, the defense called Ceballos as a 
witness to discuss his observations rega 141
Following the trial, Ceballos alleged he suffered adverse employment 
actions.142  After administrative avenues failed, Ceballos filed suit.143  
The district court found Ceballos’ speech was not protected and granted 
summary judgment for the employer.144  The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
concluding that the memo’s content regarded official misconduct, which 
is a matter of public concern.145 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized the two-prong test 
established by Pickering and its progeny: “whether the employee spoke 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” and “whether the relevant 
government entity has an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently from any other member of the general public.”146  
The Court then elaborated on what it means to speak as a citizen, 
holding “that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”147  Unfortunately, the Court 
 137. Id. at 413–14.  After conducting an investigation, Ceballos concluded the affidavit contained 
misrepresentations.  Id.  Following his investigation, Ceballos discussed the discrepancies with a deputy 
r d his supervisors and wrote a 
m Id. 
t 414.  The memo was submitted to his supervisor.  Id. 
415.  The alleged adverse employment “actions included reassignment from his 
alen
ent grievance, which was denied.  Id.  Following denial of his 
p
itten pursuant to employment duties and therefore, was not protected 
y t   Id.  Additionally, qualified immunity provided alternative grounds for 
an
a citizen on a matter of public concern, 
she iff.  Id.  Unsatisfied with the explanation, Ceballos contacte
me orandum.  
 138. Id. a
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 414–15. 
 142. Id. at 
c dar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a 
promotion.”  Id. 
 143. Id.  Ceballos filed an employm
em loyment grievance, suit was filed in federal court alleging retaliation for the memo, which violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
 144. Id.  The memo was wr
b he First Amendment.
gr ting summary judgment.  Id. 
 145. Id. at 415–16. 
 146. Id. at 418.  In order for the court to have to address the second inquiry, the answer to the first 
question must be affirmative.  If the speech was not spoken as 
then “the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to 
the speech.”  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 147. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–22.  “[A] citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a 
citizen.”  Id. at 411.  Precedent has recognized the interests served by allowing employees to speak, but 
have sought to balance the individual and societal interests with allowing government employees to 
18
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failed to provide a comprehensive framework for determining whether 
speech is pursuant to an employee’s official duties.148  However, the 
Court did indicate that the determination should be made after a 
practical inquiry.149  The Court did not elaborate on whether the judge or 
the jury is to make this practical inquiry. 
In summation, the Supreme Court has established a three-prong test to 
determine whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally 
protected.150  First, the speech must be made as a citizen, which means 
the speech cannot be made pursuant to official employment duties.151  
Second, the speech must be on a matter of public concern.152  Third, the 
Court must determine whether the government as an employer has 
grounds for treating the employee differently than the general public.153 
IV. DEVELOPING A CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ INABILITY TO 
CONSISTENTLY ALLOCATE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE’S SPEECH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
In Connick, the Supreme Court exercised its power to classify issues 
within a trial as either questions of law or questions of fact.154  The 
Connick Court indicated that the “inquiry into the protected status of 
speech is one of law, not fact.”155  Courts have questioned whether 
 
speak and the governmental and societal interests in efficient performance of public functions.  Id.  A 
key distinction is that the First Amendment does not provide a means of constitutionalizing an 
employee’s grievance. 
 148. Id. at 424. 
 149. Id. at 424–25.  By indicating that the inquiry is a practical one, the Supreme Court was 
attempting to prevent government employers from incorporating overbroad formal job descriptions in an 
attempt to expand the scope of professional duties and overly-restricting their employees’ First 
Amendment rights. 
 150. Whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected is only one aspect of a First 
Amendment retaliation suit.  If the speech is protected, the employee must show that the protected 
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action taken against them, 
meaning there must be a causal connection.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 287 (1977).  The government can escape liability for an alleged constitutional violation if they 
provide evidence that the adverse employment would have occurred regardless of the protected speech.  
Id.  Since these other factors are outside of the purpose of this Comment, they are not addressed 
completely.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 92, § 2.20, for a complete discussion of the development of the 
public employee speech analytical framework. 
 151. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  Since Ceballos’ statements were “made pursuant to his duties as a 
calendar deputy,” his speech was not constitutionally protected and the inquiry ended.  Id.  The Court 
did not go on to discuss whether his speech was on a matter of public concern and did not employ the 
Pickering balancing test, which indicates the threshold nature of this prong. 
 152. Id. at 418. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 155. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). 
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rt concludes by discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
the protected status of a public employee’s speech is a mixed question of 
law and fact. 
rcuits that have held the issue to be a question of law, followed by 
the circuits that have held the issue to be a mixed question of law and 
fact. 
Connick’s classification remains undisturbed after Garcetti.  Circuit 
courts have split in their attempts to ascertain if Garcetti’s test for 
determining whether speech occurs within the scope of employment 
alters Connick’s classification.  The Ninth Circuit recently joined this 
debate in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 84.156  The 
following Part provides an overview of Posey and an analysis of the 
split.  This Pa
A. The Circuit Split 
In Posey, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the inquiry into the 
protected status of speech is a question of law or fact.  The court stated it 
was clear that prior to Garcetti the “two-stage inquiry into the protected 
status of the speech was purely legal.”157  However, the court noted that 
Garcetti added a third prong to the test, “requiring a determination [as 
to] whether the plaintiff spoke as a public employee or instead [as] a 
private citizen;” this addition calls into question the previous holding 
that the protected status of speech is a question of law.158  The court 
noted that “[o]ur sister circuits are split over the resolution of this 
question.”159  While Posey provides a brief analysis of the circuit split, 
the following provides a more comprehensive discussion first addressing 
the ci
1. The Inquiry is a Question of Law 
When a court classifies an issue as a question of law, it does so 
“ordinarily without fanfare or explanation other than the ambiguous 
 
 156. 546 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2008) (the question before the court is whether in light of 
Garcetti “the inquiry into the protected status of speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim remains 
a question of law properly decided at summary judgment or instead now presents a mixed question of 
ct 
 provide a 
om o determine what constitutes the scope of an employee’s duties. 
fa and law.”). 
 157. Id. at 1126. 
 158. Id. at 1126–27.  “Given the factual disputes presented in the record, we must therefore 
determine whether the inquiry into the protected status of speech remains one purely of law as stated in 
Connick, or if instead Garcetti has transformed it into a mixed question of fact and law.”  Id. at 1127.  
The need for this determination largely arises out of the Court’s inability in Garcetti to
c prehensive framework t
 159. Id. at 1127–28. 
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ein, circuit 
co
 the same e-mail to members of 
th
cuit have also extended Connick’s 
proposition that whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally 
protected is a question of law.170 
statement that the question presented is one of law.”160  In Connick, the 
Supreme Court provided no reason for their decision to label the 
protected status of speech a question of law.161  In a similar v
urts typically provide no reason to support their view that the inquiry 
into the protected status of speech remains a question of law. 
For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that 
whether a public employee “engaged in protected speech is a purely 
legal question over which we have appellate jurisdiction.”162  In Charles 
v. Grief, Charles, an African American employee of the Texas Lottery 
Commission, e-mailed high-ranking Commission officials regarding 
racial discrimination and retaliation towards minority employees, 
including himself.163  Charles later sent
e state legislature.164  Following a meeting with human resources, 
Charles was fired.165 
On appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
Charles, the Fifth Circuit identified the inquiry into the protected status 
of speech as a purely legal question.166  In making this determination, 
the court cited to Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,167 
identifying its previous proposition that in determining whether a public 
employee’s speech is constitutionally protected, Garcetti merely shifted 
the “focus from the content of the speech to the role the speaker 
occupied when he said it.”168  Based on this mere shift, the Fifth Circuit 
relied on Connick for the proposition that the inquiry into the protected 
status of speech is a question of law.169  Likewise, the Tenth Circuit and 
the District of Columbia Cir
 
 160. Louis, supra note 57, at 1018. 
yers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (“The inquiry into the protected status of 
pee act.”). 
 522 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 161. Connick v. M
f law, not fs ch is one o
 162. Charles v. Grief,
 163. Id. at 509–10. 
 164. Id. at 510. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 510, 512. 
 167. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 692. 
 169. Charles, 522 F.3d at 512. 
 170. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).  After 
Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit holds the analysis for a public employee’s free speech retaliation claim 
requires five steps: whether the employee spoke pursuant to his official duties, whether the speech was 
on a matter of public concern, whether the employee’s interests outweigh the state’s interests as an 
employer, the speech must be a substantial or motivating factor in the detrimental employment action, 
and there must not be other grounds that indicate the employer would have took similar actions.  Id. at 
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2. The Inquiry is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
In contrast to the Fifth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, the 
Third and Eighth Circuits have, to some extent, questioned the view that 
the constitutionally protected status of speech is a question of law.171  In 
a pre-Garcetti case, the Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that the 
inquiry into the protected status of speech is a question of law for the 
court,172 indicated that “[a]ny underlying factual disputes concerning 
whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected, however, should be 
submitted to the jury.”173  The court indicated that it is responsible for 
combining the jury’s factual findings with the court’s legal conclusions 
to determine whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected.174 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Third Circuit has expressly held the 
inquiry into the protected status of speech to be a mixed question of law 
and fact.175  In Foraker v. Chaffinch,176 the Third Circuit held that 
“[u]nlike the question of whether speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, the question of whether a particular incident of speech is 
made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed question of fact 
 
1202–03.  “The first three steps are to be resolved by the district court, while the last two are ordinarily 
for the trier of fact.”  Id. at 1203 (citing Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 
1998)); see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  After Garcetti, the Circuit Court 
ns of law for the court to resolve.  Id. at 1149 
the district court cites Davis for the 
 public concern.  Id.  
Thi  n.7). 
f Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 a mixed question of fact and law’”) (quoting 
a (3d Cir. 2007)). 
1 (3d Cir. 2007). 
for the District of Columbia still maintains the four prong analysis for a public employee free speech 
retaliation claim with the first two prongs being that “the public employee must have spoken as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern” and whether the employee’s interests outweigh the government’s interest.  
The court indicates that these first two factors are questio
(citing Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
 171. In Posey, the court indicates that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has implicitly sided with the Third 
Circuit [holding that the constitutionally protected status of speech is a mixed question of law and fact], 
concluding in Davis v. Cook County, that summary judgment was appropriate because ‘no rational trier 
of fact could find’ that Davis’s speech had been made in her capacity as a private citizen.”  Posey v. 
Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Davis v. Cook 
County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008)).  However, a more in depth glance at Davis indicates that the 
court states “[f]urther, ‘[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.’”  Davis, 
534 F.3d at 653 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)).  The court goes on to say 
“[r]aising a First Amendment claim, without more, does not guarantee that a jury is necessary.”  Id.; see 
also Bryant v. Gardner, 587 F. Supp.2d 951, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (
proposition that the protected status of speech is a question of law). 
 172. McGee v. Public Water Supply, Dist. No. 2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th 
Cir. 2006).  “To decide whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, a 
court must first determine” if the speech was spoken as a citizen on a matter of
“ s is a question of law for the court.”  Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148
 173. Shands v. City o
 174. Id. at 1342–43. 
 175. Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘whether a particular incident of 
speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is
For ker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 
 176. 501 F.3d 23
22
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ing over this type of litigation.   Believing the trial 
court to be in a better position to make the determination, the appellate 
court deferred to their factual finding, which indicates the inquiry is a 
question of fact.
bsequently, 
the principal severely reduced Posey’s responsibilities.   At the end of 
 
and law.”177  The court held that determining whether a public 
employee’s speech was made pursuant to their official duties is such a 
fact intensive inquiry that it is properly held as a mixed question of law 
and fact.178  Another aspect in their holding was that as a practical 
matter the trial court was in a better position to determine the extent of 
the employee’s official duties,179 largely because of the trial court’s 
experience in presid 180
181 
B. The Facts of Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84 
Robert Posey was a former high school employee who served as a 
security specialist.182  Posey developed concerns about the school’s 
safety and emergency policies and communicated those concerns to the 
high school’s principal.183  When the principal failed to respond, Posey 
wrote a letter to his friend Steve Battenschlag, who was the school 
district’s Chief Administrative Officer.184  The letter addressed Posey’s 
personal grievances and his concerns about the district’s inadequate 
security policies.185  Following the letter, Battenschlag and the school 
district’s superintendent met with Posey at his home.186  Su
187
 177. Id. at 240. 
 178. Id.  But see Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (whether speech is 
rote
citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
e Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The letter was copied to the Superintendent Mark Berryhill,” and two other 
dm
fety and school 
vac ning.”  Id.  Posey supported each concern with a specific example.  Id. 
ith police, enforcing truancy policies, searching students, and investigating 
duct.”  Id. 
p cted is a question of law). 
 179. Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240–41. 
 180. Id. (
 181. Id. 
 182. Posey v. Lak
 183. Id. at 1124. 
 184. Id. (“
a inistrators.). 
 185. Id.  The letter contained both personal grievances and concerns about inadequate safety.  Id.  
The personal grievance dealt with how the principal treated and dealt with Posey.  Id.  The letter 
specifically addressed Posey’s concerns about inadequate safety including: “(1) the administration’s 
general unresponsiveness to safety problems, (2) inadequate staff and faculty training, (3) concealment 
and insufficient documentation of safety violations, (4) ineffective enforcement of truancy policies, (5) 
ineffective enforcement of sexual harassment policies, and (6) inadequate fire sa
e uation plan
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1125.  The principal reduced Posey’s job responsibilities including relieving Posey’s 
“responsibility for all specified tasks except assisting with security and crime prevention, and 
supervising the school parking lot, grounds, and hallways.”  Id.  In addition, Posey “was no longer 
responsible for liaising w
student miscon
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the
 precluding First Amendment protection.   The 
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and 
P




 following school year, Posey’s responsibilities were consolidated 
with those of three other employees, and Posey was fired.188 
Posey filed a grievance.189  When administrative efforts failed, Posey 
filed suit in state court alleging various state claims as well as a § 1983 
claim asserting he was retaliated against for his letter and subsequent 
meeting with school officials.190  The school district removed the case to 
federal court.191  After discovery, the defendant moved for summary 
judgment claiming Posey’s speech was made pursuant to his 
employment duties 192
osey appealed.193 
Public Employee’s Speech is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
After addressing the circuit split addressed above, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “the determination [as to] whether the speech in question 
was spoken as a public employee or a private citizen presents a mixed 
question of fact and law.”194  In making this determination, the Ninth 
Circuit focused on the Supreme Court’s precedent distinguishing 
questions of law from questions of fact instead of relying on the Court’s 
conclusory indication in Connick.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“facts that can be ‘found’ by ‘application of . . . ordinary principles of 
logic and common experience . . . are ordinarily entrusted to the finder 
of fact.’”195  Since Garcetti indicated that the scope of an employee’s 
official duties is a practical, not a mechanical, inquiry, “the scope and
ntent of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities can and should be found by a 
trier of fact” by applying principles of logic and common experience.196 
After indicating that determining the extent of a plaintiff’s job duties 
was a question of fact for the jury, the court considered potential reasons 
for removing the issue from the jury.  The court held that allowing the 
jury to make a factual determination as to a plaintiff’s job 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.  Following the initial grievance, the school board determined Posey was the subject of 
etter.  Id.  However, the governing board of the district voided this conclusion.  Id. 
6. 
129 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
)). 
retaliation for his l
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1125–2
 193. Id. at 1126. 
 194. Id. at 1127–29. 
 195. Id. at 1
501 n.17 (1984
 196. Id. 
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the issue 
fro
 in Posey’s case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
co
 
responsibilities does “not encroach upon the court’s prerogative to 
interpret and apply the relevant legal rules.”197  Additionally, while the 
possibility exists that the jury’s factual conclusion could be dispositive 
of a constitutional question, this is not grounds for removing 
m the jury.198  Even if an issue is a factual determination, the court is 
still obligated to evaluate the significance of the facts found.199 
Regarding the disposition of the case, the court concluded a genuine 
issue of material fact existed as to Posey’s job responsibilities, which 
precluded summary judgment as to whether Posey spoke as a citizen.200  
However, the court recognized that alternative grounds for summary 
judgment could exist in dealing with whether an employee’s speech is 
constitutionally protected.201  These alternative grounds included the 
speech not being on a matter of public concern or the presence of 
adequate government justification for treating the employee differently 
than a member of the general public.202  With neither of the alternative 
grounds present
urt’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings.203 
The Ninth Circuit held that “the inquiry into the protected status of 
speech presents a mixed question of fact and law,” specifically holding 
that the scope of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of fact.204  
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently affirmed its holding in Posey.205  In 
Posey, the court also set out a general process for addressing whether a 
public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected.  The inquiry 
begins by first answering the two legal questions: whether the speech 
was on a matter of public concern and whether the state lacked grounds 
to treat the employee differently than the general public.206  If and only 
if the court answers these two questions in the affirmative does the issue 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)). 
 199. Id. at 1129 (citing Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 500–01).  “Indeed, although a fact-finder’s 
determination as to a plaintiff’s job responsibilities may at times appear in itself dispositive of the 
protected status inquiry, the ‘rule of independent review’ will always require the court independently to 
evaluate the ultimate constitutional significance of the facts as found.”  Id. 
t 1129–30. 
1. 
. York, 566 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he scope 
f [p fact.”). 
.3d at 1130–31. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. a
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1130–3
 204. Id. at 1130. 
 205. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining a plaintiff’s job 
responsibilities is a question of fact); Robinson v
o laintiff’s] job duties is a question of 
 206. Posey, 546 F
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 a genuine issue “as to the scope and content of the plaintiff’s 
job responsibilities,” the jury must decide the extent of an employee’s 
job du ee 
s
V. TO PRESERV ERMINING THE 




precedent is inconclusive.   One scholar argued that policy 
of whether the public employee spoke as a citizen become relevant.207  
If there is
ties before the court can determine in what role the employ
poke.208 
E THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT, DET
ONSTITUIONALLY ROTECTED TATUS OF A UBLIC MPLOYEE S REE 
PEECH MUST PARTIALLY FALL TO THE JURY AND BE LABELED A MIXED 
QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT 
In a trial regarding public employee free speech, the right to a jury 
trial will almost always be present.  A suit alleging First Amendment 
retaliation will be brought under § 1983.209  In a § 1983 action, the 
parties will have a right to a jury trial if the relief sought is legal in 
nature.210  A First Amendment retaliation suit requires an adverse 
employment action be taken against the employee,211 which likel
sult in the plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for lost wages.212  
Compensatory damages are traditionally legal relief, virtually ensuring 
the parties a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.213 
Since the right to a jury trial seems to exist in a § 1983 suit for First 
Amendment retaliation, the remainder of this Part focuses on whether 
the constitutionally protected status of a public employee’s free speech, 
specifically when determining the scope of a plaintiff’s official duties, is 
an issue that must be decided by the jury to preserve the substance of the 
right to a jury trial.  This analysis will take place using three of the four 
Markman factors: (1) historical analogy; (2) functional considerations; 
and (3) the importance of uniformity.214  The fourth Markman factor, 
precedent, will not be considered since, as indicated by the circuit split, 
215
considerations should be used exclusively in determining the proper 
 
 207. Id. at 1131. 
 208. Id.  Judgment is reserved until after the fact-finding process so that the jury may determine 
the plaintiff’s job responsibilities.  Id. 
rse employment actions include termination of 
p
RTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
 209. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 150.  Examples of adve
em loyment or demotion. 
 212. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TO
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 855–57 (5th ed. 2005). 
 213. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 157–181 and accompanying text. 
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arkman 
analysis can be used to label the inquiry as one of law or fact.217 
A. Historical Analogy 
cted status of speech was historically 
lef
judicial actor.216  Although not used exclusively, policy considerations 
are integrated into the Markman analysis.  The results of the M
Historically, American juries have been viewed as protectors of 
liberty.218  In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton indicated that the 
only difference between the supporters of the Constitution and its 
opponents when it came to the role of juries was that “the former regard 
it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very 
palladium of free government.”219  The first Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, John Jay, in the first jury case before the Supreme 
Court, informed the jurors that they had the right to determine the law 
and the facts of the case.220  While the historical importance of the jury 
is not doubted, Markman’s historical analogy requires an analysis as to 
whether the constitutionally prote
t to the jury at common law.221 
At common law, there was no First Amendment.  The closest analogy 
at common law is a seditious libel claim.222  Within seditious libel 
jurisprudence, debate existed regarding the proper role of the judge and 
the jury.223  Two competing viewpoints existed, each of which affected 
 
 216. Parker, supra note 10, at 488–501 (“Part I of this article evaluates the traditional way in 
which courts label issues either questions of fact or questions of law.  The mechanical adhesion to the 
Coke maxim [see supra note 10] is not, however, suited to the complex issues involved in free 
expression cases.  A better approach is to adopt a policy-based determination of what issues should be 
given to the jury and what issues reserved for the court.”). 
 217. The question of law/fact dichotomy can arise without a jury trial, see supra note 67, but when 
the right to a jury trial exists and an issue must fall to the jury to preserve the jury trial right, that 
conclusion would provide evidence that the inquiry should be a question of fact. 
 218. Parker, supra note 10, at 496. 
 219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 220. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (“It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind 
you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is 
the province of the court to decide.  But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this 
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of 
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.  On this, and on every other occasion, 
however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as 
on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, 
presumable, that the court are the best judges of law.  But still both objects are lawfully, within your 
power of decision.”). 
 221. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (if the “clear historical 
evidence that the very subsidiary question was so regarded under the English practice of leaving the 
issue for a jury,” then the issue is required to go to the jury). 
 222. Parker, supra note 10, at 502. 
 223. Id. 
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act 
oc
 and fact under 
the [F]irst [A]mendment.”   Based on historical analogy to seditious 
libel cases at common law, it appears that juries should have a role in 
resolving the constitutionally
 must consider two levels of actors.  First, which actor, 
 
the perceived role of the jury.  One view was autocratic, holding that the 
rulers were superior to their people and that the jury’s only role within a 
seditious libel suit was “determining whether [the] publication in f
curred and whether it referred to a member of the ruling class.”224  In 
the contrasting view, the rulers were servants of the people, a theory 
which gave juries the primary decision-making role in a libel suit.225 
The trial of Peter Zenger demonstrates that the debate between the 
conflicting viewpoints was resolved in favor of the latter.  Peter Zenger, 
the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was prosecuted for 
protesting the Royal Governor’s removal of the colony’s chief justice.226  
Zenger’s attorney argued the jury had “the right, beyond all dispute, to 
determine both the law and the fact; and where they do not doubt of the 
law, they ought to do so.”227  The colonial court concluded that the issue 
of libel was for the jury.228  As one scholar has noted, “[t]he Peter 
Zenger case firmly established that juries in the American colonies had 
the right to decide the libel issue.”229  The scholar went on to say “[t]he 
historical record strongly suggests that the Founders would insist that 
citizen jurors have input in resolving mixed issues of law
230
 protected status of speech. 
B. Functional Considerations 
“[T]he decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of 
fact,’ or a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a 
matter of allocation as it is of analysis.”231  When the court allocates an 
issue, it traditionally focuses on the sound administration of justice.232  
In considering the sound administration of justice, the various 
experiences of each judicial actor must be considered to determine 
which actor is in the best position to address the issue.233  The best 
position inquiry
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 503. 
 226. See Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 675 (1735), quoted in IRVING BRANT, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 175 (1965). 
 227. Id. at 178. 
 228. Id. at 179. 
 229. Parker, supra note 10, at 503. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112–14 (1985). 
 232. Id. at 114. 
 233. Id. 
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the
.  The Court has also held that a § 1983 
su
ing the scope of an employee’s official duties, these judgments 
are
 judge or the jury, within the trial court is in the best position; second, 
is the trial court or the appellate court in a better position to make the 
determination? 
At the trial court level, the jury is in a better position to determine the 
scope of an employee’s duties.  The Garcetti Court indicated that the 
inquiry into whether a public employee’s speech is made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties must be a practical inquiry requiring more 
than simply looking at a formal job description.234  With the practical 
nature of the inquiry in mind, the jury is likely more competent to make 
the determination than the judge
it sounds in tort law.235  Similarity to tort law allows for comparison 
to a tort suit holding an employer liable for their employees’ actions 
under a theory of respondeat superior. 
To hold an employer liable under a theory of respondeat superior, the 
jury must determine “whether [the] employee was acting within the 
course and scope of his job.”236  In making this determination, the judge 
usually applies the set of facts, whether undisputed or found by the jury, 
to the legal standard.237  The theory behind allowing the jury to decide 
this type of question is that jury members have a variety of real world 
experiences that judges often lack.238  Additionally, a group of people 
tend to “know more of the common affairs of life than does one man 
[and] . . . can draw wiser and safer conclusions from . . . facts . . . than 
can a single judge.”239  When it comes to making “subjective judgments 
based on peoples’ experiences and perceptions of the world,” such as 
determin
 “best made by a group, rather than by a single individual.”240  Jurors 
are in a better position to make practical determinations than are trial 
judges. 
The best position inquiry needs to take into account whether the trial 
or appellate court is in a better position.  This inquiry is necessary due to 
the differences in appellate review regarding a question of law and one 
of fact.  A factual finding is given deference and will only be overturned 
if it is clearly erroneous.241  Labeling an issue as a question of fact 
significantly raises “the height of the hurdles over which an appellant 
 
 234. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006). 
 235. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999). 
ner, supra note 3, at 111. 
 84 U.S. 657, 663–64 (1873). 
. 
a note 2, at 233. 
 236. War
 237. Id. 
 238. Reytblat, supra note 4, at 196. 
 239. Sioux City &. Pac. R.R.Co. v. Stout,
 240. Reytblat, supra note 4, at 197
 241. Hofer, supr
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hich little deference should be paid — conventionally, an issue of 
the first three functional 
an
 
must leap in order to prevail on appeal.”242  An inherent difference 
exists between trial and appellate courts, which is a partial source for the 
level of deference given to factual findings.  Trial courts have the benefit 
of live testimony while appellate courts are bound to the cold record.243  
Live testimony provides the opportunity “to view the demeanor of 
witnesses and assess their cre 244
pellate court should defer to the findings of a trial court, scholars hav
veloped a functional analysis looking at whether the trial court’
termination was based upon: 
(1) An assessment of the credibility of any witnesses? (2) A weighing of 
conflicting testimony? (3) A weighing of conflicting evidence? and (4) 
The application of a statute within the particular expertise of that 
tribunal?  Negative answers to all these questions suggest that the issue is 
one to w
law.  Affirmative answers to any of these questions suggest that the issue 
is one to which some deference should be paid — conventionally, one of 
fact.245 
Using this functional analysis, it appears that the trial court is in a 
better position to determine the scope of a public employee’s duties.  As 
stated in Garcetti, the scope of an employee’s duties is not based on a 
written job description.  Instead, it is a practical inquiry.  Questions must 
be answered such as: What tasks did you perform on a daily basis?  How 
often did you perform a particular task?  What was your understanding 
of your job?  These are all questions answered while the employee is 
testifying.  The employer will also have to answer similar questions 
creating the potential for conflicting testimony.  With this in mind, there 
would be affirmative answers to at least 
alysis questions.  The importance of the live record indicates that the 
appellate court must pay deference to the trial court’s determination246 
indicating that the issue is likely one of fact. 
Court efficiency also plays a role in allocating authority to the trial 
court over the appellate court.  In modern America, a litigation 
explosion burdens the court system.247  The appellate courts, through 
 242. Id. at 232. 
 State v. Pepin, 328 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 “based on facts or circumstances that are critical to decision and 
is, supra note 57, at 1013. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 238 (quoting
 245. Id. at 242. 
 246. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 664 (1971) (one reason for an appellate court deferring to the trial court is the 
superiority of the trial court’s position in being present at the time; conferring to the trial court is 
especially important when a decision is
that the record imperfectly conveys”). 
 247. Lou
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r than would trial level fact 
fin
the forum, establishes “what 
da
 
their crowded dockets and busy time schedules, receive the brunt of the 
adverse affects of this explosion, which has resulted in a “modern shift 
in power towards the trial level.”248  When it comes to mixed questions, 
it makes sense to allocate them to the discretion of the trial court and 
limit the standard of appellate review.  If the standard of review is not 
limited and appellate courts more frequently review the issues de novo, 
the “appellate courts would have to steal the necessary additional time 
from the law-declaring function, which has already received short shrift 
in this era of crowded dockets.”249  In addition, increased de novo 
review would further burden the appellate courts’ time due to a likely 
increase in frivolous appeals.  In many issues involving mixed questions, 
appellate courts also do not have any “special competence . . . and would 
not necessarily decide them [any] bette
ders.”250  As a matter of efficiency, policy considerations favor trial 
level decision-making with a limited standard of appellate review,251 
which are hallmarks of a question of fact. 
Court efficiency also provides further functional considerations 
outside of comparing the positions of trial and appellate courts.  A 
potential fear of turning the constitutionally protected status of speech 
into a mixed question of law and fact is that it will diminish the court’s 
ability to grant summary judgment.  However, even if one inquiry is 
reserved for the jury, the court still maintains its judicial screening 
role.252  The judicial screening role “entails regulating the actions of the 
parties to ensure that the adjudicative process unfolds in a way that 
comports with systemic norms.”253  When exercising its screening role, 
the court determines the appropriateness of 
ta may be relied upon in deciding any question, as well as whether a 
proposed question is appropriate,” and concludes “whether reasonable 
minds could differ on a question posed.”254 
By determining if reasonable minds could differ, the court exercises 
procedural control over the proceedings.255  Procedural control is 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1013–14. 
 251. Reytblat, supra note 4, at 211.  By allocating an issue as a question of fact entitled to 
appellate court deference, the appellate court avoids duplicating the efforts of the trial court saving delay 
e case.  Nevertheless, these decisions are not understood to implicate the Seventh 
me  
tblat, supra note 4, at 212. 
and time. 
 252. Kirgis, supra 14, at 1146 (“In the screening role, the judge makes many decisions involving 
the ‘facts’ of th
A ndment.”).
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1152. 
 255. Rey
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n a reasonable trier of fact could only reach one conclusion.   
Bo
as a matter of law can still be granted based on 
the other prongs of the inquiry.  This procedural control allows the court 
to eliminate frivolo ious claims with a 
more in-depth analysis. 
maintained regardless of whether an issue is a question of law or fact.256  
Through their procedural control, a judge can still grant a motion for 
summary judgment if the evidence does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact.257  A judge can grant motions for judgment as a matter of 
law whe 258
th summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law would be 
permissible when speech is so clearly within the scope of an employee’s 
duties. 
Even if there is a question as to the scope of an employee’s duties, the 
inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of speech could be 
tailored to consider this question last.259  In other words, by first 
addressing whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern 
and whether the public employee’s rights are greater than the 
government’s rights as an employer, the court can often determine the 
issue without reaching the factual questions.  Motions for summary 
judgment and judgment 
us claims while providing meritor
C. The Importance of Uniformity 
Within the context of public employee free speech, the quest for 
uniformity is illusory.260  For the Supreme Court, uniformity does not 
appear to be a concern.  In Pickering, the Court indicated that they were 
merely providing some general guidelines, not a comprehensive 
standard.261  The Garcetti Court also failed to provide a standard.262  In 
addition, the Court also held that job descriptions do not determine the 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 259. See supra notes 206–208 and accompanying text. 
 260. Parker, supra note 10, at 543 (“The Court’s quest for uniformity, however, is largely illusory.  
Notably absent from Connick and its progeny is any guidance for judges facing future first amendment 
claims.  What quantum of ‘inefficiency’ will be tolerated before the disruption caused by an employee’s 
speech will destroy the right to speak?  How many recipients are necessary to make a credit report a 
matter of public concern?  Clearly Connick will allow judges who are most sympathetic to employees to 
rule in favor of first amendment claims and will also allow judges who pay greater deference to ‘at will’ 
employment interests in government agencies to hold first amendment claims to be frivolous.  Whatever 
the philosophical bent of judges faced with future free speech claims, each judge may, in effect, be 
applying his or her individual ‘community mores’ standard to determine how much ‘free’ speech will be 
tolerated.”). 
 261. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968). 
 262. See supra note 148–149 and accompanying text. 
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sc
urrence of the fact pattern to which 
the
 factor can vary from case to 
case, it is impossible to structure a framework that would influence 
employer or employee beha cant way.  The structure of 
the public employee free speech analy
pr
idence, also indicates that the jury is the 
pr
 
ope of an employee’s duties, virtually eliminating any uniform method 
of determining such duties.  Any hope of salvaging a uniform means of 
deciding the scope of an employee’s duties was destroyed when the 
Court indicated that it was a practical inquiry. 
“Unlike the declaration of a judge, a jury verdict carries no 
precedential value. . . .”263  Some areas of the law require uniformity and 
certainty,264 which can trump any consideration in favor of a jury.  
When considering the importance of uniformity, two factors should be 
measured: “(1) the likelihood of rec
 law is being applied in a specific case; and[,] (2) regardless of the 
probability of repetition of a fact pattern, whether an example of law 
application by a judge can realistically be expected to have an influence 
on prospective human behavior.”265 
Neither of these factors indicates a need for uniformity.  The practical 
nature of the inquiry of an employee’s job duties precludes these factors.  
A practical inquiry takes into account the individual variances of each 
employment situation.  Meaning for each employee different facts will 
need to be considered to determine the scope of their official duties.  The 
level of specificity required for a practical inquiry precludes the 
recurrence of fact patterns.  Furthermore, the practical inquiry will vary 
depending on the time, context, and content of the speech.  In such a fact 
intensive inquiry where potentially every
vior in any signifi
tical framework virtually 
ecludes any possibility for uniformity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Markman factors demonstrate that a portion of the inquiry into 
the constitutionally protected status of speech, specifically the scope of a 
public employee’s job duties, must fall to the jury to maintain the 
substance of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial.  By 
mandating that part of the inquiry falls to the jury, the issue is properly 
labeled a mixed question of law and fact.  The practical nature of the 
inquiry into an employee’s job duties, which will likely require witness 
testimony and demeanor ev
oper party to decide the issue.  The need for court efficiency provides 
 263. Parker, supra note 10, at 501. 
 264. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 265. Parker, supra note 10, at 501 (citing Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-
Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1926–27 (1966)). 
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en addresses whether the 
public employee spoke as a citizen.   If there is a genuine issue “as to 
the scope and content of the plaintiff’s job responsibilities,” the jury 
must decide the extent of an employee’s job duties before the court can 
determine in what role the employee spoke.268 
 
support for labeling the issue a question of fact.  Appellate courts review 
findings of fact with deference, which save judicial resources by 
avoiding repetitive analysis. 
By mandating that the scope of an employee’s duties is to be decided 
by the jury, the inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of 
speech becomes, as indicated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, a mixed 
question of law and fact.  As a means of maintaining efficiency, the 
Ninth Circuit provided an adequate procedure for addressing the 
protected status of a public employee’s speech.  First, the court should 
address the legal questions: determining if the speech was on a matter of 
public concern and if the government had grounds for treating the 
employee differently than the general public.266  If the case cannot be 
resolved based on legal questions, the court th
267
 266. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 267. Id. at 1131. 
 268. Id.  (Judgment is reserved until after the fact-finding process so that the jury may determine 
the plaintiff’s job responsibilities). 
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